Intermediarios y corrupción, ¿por qué encajan tan bien?

Posted on January 4th 2011, by Matteo Bigazzi

Versión en inglés

Los intermediarios, en sentido amplio, son los terceros relacionados con una operación, como agentes, mediadores, consultores de empresas, socios de empresas conjuntas y filiales extranjeras. Suelen poner en contacto al sector público y al privado, a cambio de una comisión: el sector privado contrata intermediarios para pagar sobornos, a menudo para obtener beneficios a los que ya tendría derecho, y buena parte (aunque no todo) ese dinero pasa a manos de los funcionarios públicos. La importancia de los intermediarios, en el gran engranaje de la corrupción, es extraordinaria.

Hay gran cantidad de argumentos convincentes que pueden alegarse para demostrar que los intermediarios son el principal catalizador de las operaciones corruptas. Aunque, como suele ocurrir, no hay mejor argumento que la simple observación.

Durante los últimos dos años, hemos asistido a algunas resoluciones sin precedentes en aplicación de la ley estadounidense de prácticas corruptas en el extranjero (FCPA, de Foreign Corrupt Practices Act): en 2008, Siemens aceptó el acuerdo de resolución de la autoridad supervisora más caro en la historia de la aplicación de la FCPA, que ascendía a 800 millones de USD. La actuación supervisora por parte de las autoridades alemanas elevó el coste total para que Siemens resolviera sus expedientes en todo el mundo hasta 1.600 millones de USD. Un año más tarde, fue una filial de Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root, la que puso aún más alto el listón del acuerdo FCPA más cuantioso pagado por una empresa estadounidense: una suma total de 579 millones de USD en multas y reintegros.

*Las prácticas corruptas que subyacen a estas actuaciones supervisoras nos dan una idea de la naturaleza de la corrupción. En el caso de Kellogg Brown & Root, el Consejero Delegado admitió haber “negociado el importe de los sobornos con los representantes de los cargos públicos y haber acordado contratar a dos agentes para pagar los sobornos,… en torno a 132 millones de USD para el primer agente, una empresa consultora constituida en Gibraltar y más de 50 millones de USD para el segundo agente, una empresa de negociación global radicada en Tokio (Japón)”. Ello a cambio de la concesión de cuatro contratos en Nigeria, valorados en torno a 6.000 millones de USD.

En el caso de Siemens, según los informes de la SEC, la empresa “realizó miles de pagos independientes a terceros de forma que quedara encubierto el propósito y el receptor final del dinero. Al menos 4.283 de dichos pagos, que en total representaban una cantidad próxima a los 1.400 millones de USD, se utilizaron para sobornar a funcionarios públicos a cambio de negocios para Siemens en todo el mundo”.

Estas cifras son, sencillamente, pasmosas. Miles de millones de dólares en sobornos pagados a través de intermediarios por solo dos empresas no solo demuestran las dimensiones del problema de la corrupción, sino que ponen de manifiesto el papel esencial que desempeñan los intermediarios; sería razonable afirmar que, sin su participación, la corrupción no habría alcanzado estas proporciones.

Por lo tanto, no debe sorprender que los intermediarios hayan atraído la atención de los reguladores desde el nacimiento mismo de la legislación anticorrupción. Al hablar de los orígenes de la FCPA, y en concreto de la investigación de la SEC sobre aportaciones ilegales a la campaña electoral en la era Watergate, Stanley Sporkin, antiguo director del Departamento de Cumplimiento legal de la SEC, recuerda que llegó un día y “le pidió a Bob Ryan, del personal, que fuera a Gulf Oil y averiguara cómo realizaba esta empresa los pagos y cómo reflejaba en su contabilidad los pagos ilegales. Este volvió al cabo de un día con todo el caso resuelto. En Gulf Oil habían creado dos filiales ficticias, a las que habían llamado Bahamas X y Bahamas Y, después habían depositado 5 millones de USD en cada una y habían remitido el dinero de vuelta a las oficinas de la empresa para guardarlo en la caja fuerte del Consejero Delegado. Y esa era la fuente de los pagos”.

La aplicación más reciente de la ley anticorrupción, como en los casos mencionados más arriba, confirma que el modelo de corrupción centrado en los intermediarios sigue conservando la misma importancia, si no más. Estudios académicos recientes sobre reformas anticorrupción aportan nuevas pruebas del carácter esencial de los intermediarios en la corrupción.

Así pues ¿qué es lo que hace que los intermediarios encajen tan bien en la corrupción?

Está muy extendida la idea de que las empresas recurren a intermediarios para evitar tener contacto directo con la corrupción, básicamente como facilitadores de pagos indebidos. Esto sin duda es verdad, pero también resulta excesivamente simplista. Los intermediarios interactúan con la corrupción a muchos niveles, por lo que reducir su papel a la mera canalización de los sobornos supondría subestimar en gran medida su importancia.

Los intermediarios son el punto de encuentro entre las partes relevantes de una operación corrupta. Proporcionan un foro informal para las conversaciones y la búsqueda de intereses convergentes, los cuales, debido a su naturaleza ilegal o impropia, no pueden discutirse abiertamente. En virtud de esa penetrabilidad, los intermediarios influyen y definen la esencia misma de una operación corrupta, a menudo superponiéndose en cada fase, o elemento, del proceso.

Ahora conviene que consideremos más de cerca las características básicas que hacen que los intermediarios sirvan tan bien a este propósito.

Los intermediarios son, ante todo, creadores de oportunidad, en más de un sentido. Actúan proporcionando a sus clientes (pagadores y receptores de sobornos) un variado abanico de servicios que van mucho más allá de una transferencia encubierta de efectivo. Actúan también como asesores, cazadores de talentos, estrategas para la entrada en los mercados, banqueros y gestores de riesgos. Básicamente, trasladan a la economía sumergida los servicios que normalmente se utilizan en las operaciones de negocios legales.

Veamos algunos ejemplos:

Los intermediaros son creadores del mercado de corrupción. Son decisivos a la hora de identificar oportunidades para aquellos que deseen pagar sobornos, especialmente cuando el buscarlas abiertamente es demasiado arriesgado. Pueden incluso ser capaces de promover sus servicios mediante la divulgación de sus antecedentes para, de ese modo, crearse una reputación de negociadores exitosos. Y a la inversa, también es habitual que los receptores finales de los sobornos establezcan una relación con intermediarios de confianza, cuya intervención imponen forzosamente en las operaciones, o también pueden encargarles que identifiquen empresas o personas a quienes pedir el pago de sobornos.

Esto es especialmente cierto en el caso de sectores profundamente regulados, en los que las empresas deben obtener licencias públicas para poder operar y en donde la autoridad de conceder licencias se ha atribuido a agencias públicas creadas para tal fin. Un ejemplo que ha salido recientemente a la luz afecta a las operaciones en Kirguistán de una filial de Alliance One International Inc, un comerciante de tabaco mundial. Según un expediente de agosto de 2010, a mediados de los años noventa, el gobierno de Kirguistán creó “una agencia y organismo público para gestionar y controlar las fábricas procesadoras de tabaco de titularidad pública en Kirguistán” a los que se pagaron sobornos para garantizar el acceso a las fábricas procesadoras controladas por la agencia pública con fines especiales.

Los intermediarios también son rentables. Las empresas que pretenden realizar prácticas corruptas deben asumir ciertos costes, como los derivados de buscar socios ilegales, establecer las condiciones de los acuerdos y forzar el cumplimiento de esos términos y condiciones. Los intermediarios pueden reducir considerablemente esos costes al proporcionar información al cliente potencial respecto de la capacidad de un funcionario público, o un representante del gobierno, de ofrecer realmente los servicios requeridos.

Los intermediarios facilitan un foro a las partes involucradas. Dado que quienes pagan y quienes reciben sobornos operan al margen de la ley, necesitan poder confiar los unos en los otros.

Los intermediarios aportan esa confianza gracias al carácter recurrente de sus actuaciones entre ambas partes.

Mientras que la lealtad entre las partes que participan en una operación de corrupción suele limitarse a la operación en sí, los intermediarios normalmente se acreditan mediante la continuidad de sus relaciones. Jeffrey Tessler, por ejemplo, el oscuro abogado británico, que se hizo mundialmente famoso gracias a la resolución FCPA más cuantiosa en la historia de las empresas estadounidenses, supuestamente mantuvo largas y duraderas relaciones tanto con Halliburton como con el gobierno nigeriano durante décadas antes de que el escándalo saliera a la luz. Resulta revelador que el papel central de Tesler en la estructura de corrupción fuera explicado por primera vez por un antiguo empleado de Technip, un socio francés del consorcio nigeriano dirigido por Halliburton, quizás un indicio de que Tesler no había establecido con Technip la misma relación de confianza que tenía con Halliburton.

Podría seguir, pero creo que con esto es suficiente. El alcance y la sofisticación de los servicios que ofrecen los intermediarios es de tal calibre que su papel no puede reducirse al de un instrumento auxiliar para el pago de sobornos. Allí donde hay una empresa o una persona dispuesta a sacar beneficio mediante prácticas corruptas, los intermediarios abren un mundo de oportunidades. Con la clara ventaja de que lo hacen de manera informal, oculta, pero de confianza. Esta combinación es la base de su capacidad para prosperar en entornos corruptos.

The Use of Intermediaries to Legitimise Corruption: Some Conclusions

Posted on January 4th 2011, by Matteo Bigazzi

A key attribute of intermediaries is their ability to camouflage illegitimate payments as legitimate ones. By doing so, they not only provide an aura of legality to a corrupt transaction, they also provide the perfect opportunity to generate off-book funds, which are then used for illicit payments between the parties involved.

The process by which intermediaries are used to legitimise the creation of illicit funds was clearly illustrated in the 2008 complaint made by the SEC against Siemens AG. The SEC argued that “business consultants were typically hired pursuant to business consultant agreements, contracts that on their face obligated Siemens to pay for legitimate consulting services. In reality, many business consultant agreements were shams in that the business consultants performed no services beyond funneling bribes.”

Greater detail is provided in the Statement of Offense filed by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) in connection with the guilty plea by Siemens SA, a Venezuelan subsidiary of Siemens. The document describes the mechanics behind the bribes paid by Siemens SA in exchange for the contracts to build metro systems in the cities of Valencia and Maracaibo. This involved according to the Department of Justice, the “creation of sham agreements for ‘studies,’ ‘consulting,’ ‘workshop equipment,’ ‘ and ‘supplies’ to falsely document and conceal bribe payments that were being funneled through multiple entities to officials of the Venezuelan government in exchange for favorable treatment.”

The use of intangible or difficult-to-measure deliverables to camouflage bribes is common practice in corrupt schemes. However, it is also not uncommon for corrupt payments to relate to tangible deliverables for which there does not appear to be a legitimate commercial justification. The opportunity for corruption in such cases arises from an artificial creation of a need. Although the transaction itself may not raise suspicion, as on the surface it appears legitimate, it is the raison d’être behind such transactions that should be questioned.

The Guardian reported a good example of this in early 2007, following revelations made by a Tanzanian middleman. According to the article BAE Systems, the UK’s biggest arms supplier, “secretly paid a $12 million commission into a Swiss account in a deal which led to Tanzania, one of the world’s poorest countries, buying a controversial military radar system” which critics said was not only overpriced but also “unnecessary”.

Also typical is the involvement of foreign corporate entities, typically based in offshore or otherwise secretive jurisdictions. In the case of Siemens SA, for example, a number of consulting companies were used – based in Georgia, Dubai and Cyprus – which were controlled by a Venezuelan businessman with “extensive contacts with then current and former government officials in Venezuela” and by a German individual who had been a former manager and consultant of Siemens.

So, again, we can see how and why intermediaries represent the perfect instrument for corruption. It’s a discussion that we could carry further, but I think this series of posts has proven the point. The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions put it very crisply in a recent report: “there are indications that intermediaries are involved in most foreign bribery cases.” As mentioned in previous posts, their importance for corruption is second to none.

Whilst we can dissect and analyse the characteristics of intermediaries there is little that can be done to eradicate them from international business transactions. They thrive in a bureaucracy that has been built into the commercial regulations of many countries. In fact, the symbiotic relationship between private and public sectors often cannot exist without intermediaries who are often legitimate, but just as often corrupt.

The greatest challenge for companies and individuals dealing with intermediaries is gaining a full and proper understanding of the requirement, role, activities and methods of these third parties. Without such understanding, it is impossible to assess one’s exposure to risk.

Conduits for Bribes and Guarantors of Corrupt Deals

Posted on October 21st 2010, by Matteo Bigazzi

In my last post I began analysing what it is that makes intermediaries such powerful instruments of corruption. I touched upon their ability to create opportunities for those seeking corrupt practices by transposing into the grey economy a whole host of services that are typically available in the realms of legitimate business.

The most widely acknowledged role of intermediaries is their ability to act as conduits for illicit payments. There are several reasons for this:

- Intermediaries are a vehicle for the creation of illicit funds. They provide numerous alternatives for a company to divert funds off-book, for example by invoicing for fictitious services, artificially inflating prices for real services, or fraudulently remitting discounts. Because of their versatility, intermediaries can be used to siphon off funds from virtually any department within a company; sales, marketing, and procurement to name but a few. They are also the perfect instrument for corruption schemes involving skimming. For example, when large volumes of raw materials change hands, a negligible price discrepancy can enable the generation and concealment of significant corrupt funds.

- Intermediaries are also the perfect instrument for the payment of bribes. Once intermediaries have been used to create off-book funds, they are the obvious choice for channelling such funds to the ultimate recipient of corrupt payments.

- Using intermediaries is a tested method to conceal the identity of those that are parties to a corrupt transaction. The possibility to interpose several layers of intermediaries between payers and receivers of bribes provides a level of complexity that results in the effective concealment of the nature, purpose and outcome of a corrupt transaction.

- Finally, intermediaries are often used for converting proceeds of corruption on behalf of those receiving bribes. In our work, we see countless examples of corporate vehicles, generally offshore, controlled by middlemen that hold assets such as prime real estate or luxurious yachts on behalf of those benefitting from corruption.

It is should therefore come as no surprise that the pervasive role of intermediaries has been emphatically underscored by Transparency International (TI), the leading civil society organization devoted to combating corruption. In presenting the results of its flagship Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 2006, TI’s press release stated that:

“…facilitators of corruption continue to assist political elites to launder, store and otherwise profit from unjustly acquired wealth, which often includes looted state assets. The presence of willing intermediaries – who are often trained in or who operate from leading economies — encourages corruption; it means the corrupt know there will be a banker, accountant, lawyer or other specialist ready to help them generate, move or store their illicit income… Corrupt intermediaries link givers and takers, creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and reciprocity.”

Trust is paramount. None of these transactions could occur if the parties involved did not trust each other. Trust, however, should not in this case be mistaken for good faith. The rationale for trust is purely commercial, and consists of the repeated benefits which payers and receivers of bribes are able to obtain from a continued and trusted relationship with an intermediary. Intermediaries are able to ensure that the sought after benefits are obtained by both sides of a particular deal based on the promise of future benefits to come. This enables intermediaries to position themselves as guarantors of corrupt deals.

In my next post I will spend some time discussing how intermediaries provide an aura of legitimacy to corrupt transactions, something that enables them to operate with considerable – and unsuspected – openness and freedom.

Intermediaries: Creators of Corruption Opportunities

Posted on October 4th 2010, by Matteo Bigazzi

In my last post I began discussing how a broad category of actors typically defined as “intermediaries” provide the perfect instrument to those pursuing corrupt practices. It is now worth taking a closer look at the key characteristics that make intermediaries so fit for this purpose.

Intermediaries are first and foremost creators of opportunity, in more ways than one. They do this by providing their clients (bribe payers and bribe receivers) with a range of services that go well beyond a concealed transfer of cash. They operate as advisors, head-hunters, market entry strategists, bankers and risk managers. In essence, they transpose to the grey economy those services which are typically utilised in legitimate business transactions.

Some examples:

Intermediaries are corruption’s market makers. They are instrumental in identifying opportunities for those willing to pay bribes, particularly where searching openly is too risky. They may even be in a position to advertise their services by disclosing track records and therefore establishing a reputation for getting deals done. Conversely, it is also common for those on the receiving end of bribes to establish a relationship with trusted intermediaries who are forcefully interposed in a transaction or, at times, may be mandated to identify companies or individuals from whom bribes may be sought.

This is particularly true in the case of highly regulated industries, where government licenses are required for businesses to operate and where the authority to grant such licenses is placed with government agencies created ad hoc. An example that has recently come to light involved the Kyrgyz operations of a subsidiary of Alliance One International Inc, a global tobacco merchant. According to an August 2010 filing, in the mid 1990s the government of Kyrgyzstan had established “an agency and instrumentality of the government, to manage and control the government-owned shares of the tobacco processing facilities throughout Kyrgyzstan” to which bribes were paid to assure “access to the tobacco processing facilities” controlled by the special purpose government agency.

Intermediaries are also cost efficient. Companies seeking to engage in corrupt practices are bound to face costs, such as: searching for illicit partners, determining agreement conditions and enforcing agreement terms. Intermediaries can significantly lower these costs by providing information to potential clients in respect of the capability of a government official, or representative thereof, to actually provide the required services.

Intermediaries offer a forum to the parties involved. Because payers and receivers of bribes operate outside the law, they need to trust each other: intermediaries provide this trust by virtue of the repeated nature of their interactions with both parties. Whereas loyalty between two parties of a corrupt transaction is often limited to the transaction itself, intermediaries are typically vested in the continuance of their relationships. Jeffrey Tessler for example, the indistinct British solicitor who came to world fame courtesy of the largest FCPA settlement in the history of US companies, reportedly had long standing relationships with both Halliburton and the Nigerian government for decades prior to the scandal coming to light. Tellingly, Tesler’s pivotal role in the corruption scheme was first explained to the authorities by a former employee of Technip, a French partner of the Nigerian consortium led by Halliburton, perhaps an indication that Tesler had failed to establish with Technip the same relationship of trust he enjoyed with Halliburton.

I could go on, but believe the point has been made. The extent and sophistication of the services offered by intermediaries is such that their role cannot be reduced to that of an ancillary instrument for the payment of a bribe. Where there is a company or an individual prepared to gain an advantage through corrupt practices, intermediaries will open up a world of opportunities. With the clear advantage of doing so in an informal, concealed yet trusted manner. This combination is at the root of their ability to thrive in corrupt environments.

There’s more to come on this topic — in my next post I will address the more traditional perception of intermediaries as conduits for bribes and also touch upon their unique ability to act as guarantors of corrupt transactions.

Intermediaries and Corruption – Why the Perfect Fit?

Posted on September 16th 2010, by Matteo Bigazzi

Intermediaries are a broadly defined category of third parties related to a transaction, such as agents, middlemen, business consultants, JV partners and foreign subsidiaries. They are often used to bring together the public and private sectors, for a fee, with the private sector engaging intermediaries to pay bribes, often for benefits for which they already qualify, with much (but not all) of that money being passed on to public officials. The importance of intermediaries, in the grand scheme of corruption, is second to none.

There are many compelling points that can be brought forward to argue the case of intermediaries being the principal catalyst of corrupt transactions. As is often the case, the point is best made through simple observation.

Over the past couple of years, we have witnessed some record-breaking FCPA settlements: in 2008, Siemens agreed to the highest regulatory settlement in the history of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, amounting to US$ 800 million. Regulatory action by German authorities brought the worldwide total cost to Siemens to settle its cases to US$ 1.6 billion. A year later, it was the turn of a Halliburton subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root, to top the charts for the largest FCPA settlement paid by US companies: a combined total of US$ 579 million in fines and disgorgements.

The corrupt practices underlying these regulatory actions are telling of the nature of corruption. In the case of Kellogg Brown & Root, the company’s CEO admitted to having “negotiated bribe amounts with the office holders’ representatives and agreed to hire the two agents to pay the bribes…approximately $132 million to the first agent, a consulting company incorporated in Gibraltar, and more than $50 million to the second agent, a global trading company headquartered in Tokyo, Japan.” This in exchange for the award of four contracts in Nigeria, valued at over US$ 6 billion.

In the case of Siemens, according to the SEC the company “made thousands of separate payments to third parties in ways that obscured the purpose for, and the ultimate recipients of, the money. At least 4,283 of those payments, totalling approximately US $1.4 billion, were used to bribe government officials in return for business to Siemens around the world.”

Numbers like these are, quite simply, staggering. Billions of dollars of bribes paid through intermediaries by just two companies not only demonstrates the size of the corruption problem, but also underlines the crucial role played by intermediaries: it would be reasonable to argue that without their involvement, such proportions of corruption could not be achieved.

It should therefore come as no surprise that intermediaries have caught the attention of regulators from the very genesis of anti-corruption legislation. When speaking about the origins of the FCPA, and in particular about the investigation by the SEC of illegal campaign contributions in the Watergate era, Stanley Sporkin, former director of the enforcement division at the SEC, recalled coming in one day and “asking Bob Ryan of the staff to go and find out from Gulf Oil how Gulf Oil made these payments and how did they book an illegal payment. And he came back within a day and had the whole case. They had set up two phony subsidiaries they called Bahama X and Bahama Y. They put $5 million into each one of them and took the money back to the companies’ offices and put it in the safe of the CEO, and that’s where payments came from.”

More recent anti-corruption enforcement, such as the cases mentioned above, confirm that the intermediary-centred corruption model continues to bear equal, if not greater importance. Further demonstration of the criticality of intermediaries to corruption comes from recent academic studies of anti-corruption reforms.

So what is it that makes intermediaries such a perfect fit for corruption?

There is a generalised perception that companies use intermediaries in order to avoid direct contact with corruption, essentially as facilitators of improper payments. This is obviously true, but also far too simplistic. Intermediaries interact with corruption at multiple levels and reducing their role to that of a mere conduit for bribes would equal to a gross underestimation of their importance.

Intermediaries are the meeting point between relevant parties of a corrupt transaction. They provide an informal forum for the discussion and pursuit of converging interests that, because of their illegal or improper nature, cannot be openly discussed. By virtue of such pervasiveness, intermediaries influence and define the very essence of a corrupt transaction often overlapping with every stage, or ingredient, involved in the process.

In my next few posts, I will be deconstructing the role of intermediaries touching upon the various levels and stages of their involvement with corruption. Ultimately, I hope that this analysis will help to better understand the nature of the beast and, by doing so, improve our ability to address the issues that arise from it. Be sure to stay tuned!

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Academic references:

1 – “Intermediaries and corruption” by Kevin Hasker and Cagla Okten
2 – “How Middle-men can Undermine Anti-corruption Reforms” by Kjetil Bjorvatn, Gaute Torsvik and Bertil Tungodden